State Inheritance Taxation of Employee Death Benefits by Parks, Howard E.
Denver Law Review 
Volume 45 Issue 5 Article 3 
April 2021 
State Inheritance Taxation of Employee Death Benefits 
Howard E. Parks 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr 
Recommended Citation 
Howard E. Parks, State Inheritance Taxation of Employee Death Benefits, 45 Denv. L.J. 719 (1968). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more 
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 
STATE INHERITANCE TAXATION OF
EMPLOYEE DEATH BENEFITS
By HOWARD E. PARKS*
This thoroughly documented article explores caselaw deter-
minations of estate and inheritance tax consequences which attach
to employee death benefits, Mr. Parks contrasts federal and state
tax treatments to indicate the variety of rationales by which courts
determine the character of decedent's property interests, including
powers of appointment, in death benefits, which is a key to taxation.
The author concludes with notes on two recently changed Colorado
inheritance tax laws.
HE author's attention was first drawn to the subject matter
of this article by a decision of the Colorado Supreme Court' in
which the court upheld the applicability of the inheritance tax statute
to the greater part of certain death benefits under an employee benefit
plan. This decision prompted an examination of the whole area of
death benefits under employee benefit plans.
This study revealed, first, a significant difference between state
and federal taxation of death benefits, and secondly, a great diversity
in statutory and case treatment of the problem by various state juris-
dictions. The variety of these differences and some of the underlying
general principles that can be discerned are the subject matter of
this article.
I. FEDERAL TAXATION OF DEATH BENEFITS
The Federal Government has encountered some difficulty in
attempting to impose its estate tax on certain employee benefits.
Successful taxation of such benefits by the Federal Government re-
quires that a measure of ownership be imputable to the employee.
The federal courts have held that such ownership is not evident, for
example, in those plans in which the employee does not have the
power to make a transfer to take effect at death. In such a case the
benefits are not taxable in his estate.'
* Member of the Colorado Bar; A.B. 1918, B.C.S. 1923, M.S. in Commerce 1924.
University of Denver; LL.B., Westminster Law School, 1929; past Chairman, Pro-
bate and Trust Law Section, Colorado Bar Association; Fellow of the American College
of Probate Counsel; author, COLORADO PROBATE PRACTICE MANUAL. The subject
matter of this article was covered in a paper presented by the author at the annual
meeting of the Probate and Trust Law Section of the Colorado Bar Association in
October 1963.
'People v. Bejarano, 145 Colo. 304, 358 P.2d 866 (1961).
2 E.g., Commissioner v. Twogood, 194 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1952); Herrick v. United
States, 108 F. Supp. 20 (E.D.N.Y. 1952); C. LOWNDES & R. KRAMER, Federal Estate
and Gift Taxes § 10.3 (2d ed. 1962) ; Note, Estate Taxation of Survivor Annuities,
6 STAN. L. REv. 473 (1954). With a number of important exceptions, the estate tax
is based on property in which the decedent had an interest at death. INT. REV. CODE
of 1954, § 2033.
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Federal authorities have had some success in reaching employee
death benefits, without establishing ownership, by the taxation of a
power of appointment relating to the disposition of the death bene-
fits. A power of appointment is any power, whatever the language
used to create it, which permits the donee of the power to designate,
within any prescribed limitations, who shall receive the subject matter
of the power and the shares in which that subject matter shall be
received.' The Illinois Supreme Court has defined this power as
follows:
A power of appointment is not an absolute right or property, nor
is it an estate, for it has none of the elements of an estate. The
donor does not vest in the donee of the power title to the property,
but simply vests in the donee power to appoint the one to take the
title. The appointee under the power takes title from the donor and
not from the donee of the power. 4
As power of appointment is applied to employee death benefit cases,
the donee would typically be the employee, the donor would be the
employer or the fund itself, and the appointee would be the recipient
of the death benefits.
Federal taxation of a power of appointment has been successful
only where the power is unrestricted, thus amounting to a general
power of appointment.' If there is a restriction on the right to name
a beneficiary, i.e., a special power, the exercise or lapse is nontaxable.'
Since many employee benefit plans impose some restriction on the
right to name the recipient of death benefits, only infrequently will
the power meet the statutory definition of a general power. More-
over, since 1954, the federal estate tax law, while taxing commercial
annuities to the extent that they are attributable to the decedent's
contribution, has exempted benefits paid under qualifying employee
benefit plans (and they generally are designed to qualify) except
to the extent such benefits are attributable to the direct contributions
of the employee.7
II. STATE TAXATION OF DEATH BENEFITS
The rationale of state inheritance taxation of employee death
benefits is considerably more complex when compared to the tax
practices of the federal jurisdiction. Although state courts recognize
3 RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 318 (1936); see 72 C.J.S. Powers §§ 1, 5, 31 (1951);
41 AM. JUR. Powers § 2 (1942). See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 107-1-2 (Supp. 1967)
for a statutory definition which closely followed the Restatement but which was
enacted too late to affect the recent Colorado decisions cited notes 51, 52 infra.
4 People v. Kaiser, 306 Ill. 313, 137 N.E. 826 (1923).
5Wolf v. Commissioner, 29 T.C. 441 (1957), rei'd on other grounds, 264 F.2d 82
(3d Cir. 1958). The exercise or release of only a general power is a taxable event.
INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2041.
6 Hanner v. Glenn, 111 F. Supp. 52 (W.D. Ky. 1953).
7 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2039.
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the principle of ownership as a basis for taxation and some even
adhere closely to the federal rationale on what constitutes owner-
ship, most state jurisdictions have had less difficulty than the federal
courts in discovering ownership of benefits in the deceased employee.
Nevertheless, the principle of ownership is of fundamental impor-
tance to state decisions, and it is mainly the standard of measure
that is different.
The concept of ownership can be an overriding consideration
even in jurisdictions which adopt other theories of taxation. Where
ownership can be readily established, the question can be settled on
that basis and with fairly uniform results. But where ownership
is not ascertainable, resolution of the tax question requires additional
and more complex inquiry and the results are less uniform. For
example, state inheritance tax laws almost uniformly levy a tax on
gifts or grants intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment
at or after death and in which the transferor reserves or purchases
a life income or interest. Since in such cases the decedent has retained
an indisputably large measure of ownership in the benefits purchased,
as is the case in a commercial annuity with a "refund" feature, there
have been only a few instances of litigation over the effect of the
statutes. 8 On the other hand, when the annuity or other benefit is
purchased not by the decedent but by someone else (as for example,
an employer) and the decedent does not make a transfer or convey-
ance of something in which he has a vested interest, there is not
the obvious imputation of ownership that could settle the matter.
If in such a case the decedent can be shown to have retained the
power to name a beneficiary, then he can be held to possess a suffi-
cient power over the res so that the court will look to another basis
for taxation in order to reach what is considered an equitable result.
Because of the uncertainties involved, however, decisions in these
closer cases are often in conflict.
A major difference between federal and state practice on the
taxation of powers of appointment is that states do not uniformly
tax such powers, and if they do at all, they generally make no dis-
tinction between general and special powers. Statutes may provide
specifically for taxation in either the estate of the donor or the estate
of the donee, depending upon the particular jurisdiction.
The state laws also do not provide the sweeping exemption of
employee death benefits that the federal law contains. Thus, some
8 People v. Schallerer, 12 Il. 2d 240, 145 N.E.2d 585 (1957); Gregg v. Commissioner,
315 Mass. 704, 54 N.E.2d 169 (1944); Garos v. State Tax Comm'n, 99 N.H. 319,
109 A.2d 844 (1954) ; Annot., 73 A.L.R.2d 157, 187 (1960) (dealing with employee
death benefits). See also Sager & Weinburg, State Taxation of Employee Benefits, 31




state courts tax employer benefit plans by the same rules applicable to
commercial annuities. Furthermore, unlike the federal rule, the state
courts make no distinction over whether the employer finances all
of the benefits (noncontributory plans) or only shares in the financ-
ing (contributory plans). Nor does a prohibition against assigning
rights or withdrawing from the fund - the usual spendthrift pro-
visions in such plans - make any difference. The basic reasoning
of the courts is that the contributions by the employer are made in
consideration of the services of the employee. The general effect for
inheritance tax purposes (not to be confused with the income tax
consequences) is the same as if the employee had received the amount
of the employer's contributions and had purchased his own benefits.
There is also a basic difference between an estate tax and an
inheritance tax. This detracts from the applicability of federal estate
tax cases to the interpretation of inheritance tax laws. An estate tax
is a tax on the right to transmit property interests at death or in a
transaction akin to a transfer at death.9 An inheritance tax is a tax
on the right to receive the same property in a similar transfer.' °
This essential difference in the point of tax application causes
many disparate results in the field of death taxation where transfers
are intended to take effect at or after death. To illustrate: Under an
estate tax law, if the decedent has made a completed gratuitous
transfer of some property in which he retains no economic interest
or reversion and retains no right of future control, death does not
give rise to a tax since nothing is left to pass from him on his demise.
This is true even though the income is accumulated during the donor's
life or for a period after his death, and the principal and accumula-
tions cannot be delivered to the beneficiary at any earlier time. Under
inheritance tax laws, since attention is focused on what the bene-
ficiary receives at the death of the donor by reason of the previous
transfer by him, and since the beneficiary receives nothing until the
death of the donor, the property is included in the decedent's gross
estate." The same distinction is carried over into the specific area
of employee death benefits by most state courts, which look not to
what the employee transmits to the beneficiary but to what the bene-
ficiary receives by reason of the action of the employee.
In summary, the taxing rationale applied by various state courts
may be reduced to the following essential principles: (1) imputation
of a retained ownership to the employee; (2) taxing of powers of
appointment - general and special; (3) similar treatment of em-
91 J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL GIFT AND ESTATE TAXATION § 1.02 (1959).
1 0 People v. Bemis, 68 Colo. 48, 189 P. 32 (1920).
11 Annot., 6 A.L.R.2d 223, 232 (1949).
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ployee benefit plans and commercial annuities; (4) emphasis on
inheritance taxation, i.e., on the receiving as opposed to the trans-
mitting aspects of the disposition.
III. OUTLINE OF EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS
One source of difficulty in treatment of employee benefit taxa-
tion by state courts is the great diversity of the plans that have been
devised. The following broad categories of benefit plans have been
dealt with by the courts:
(1) A noncontributory profit-sharing trust funded
entirely by the employer which provides benefits for the
surviving employee to begin at a designated time, but which
also transfers either to persons named by the employee or
to the employee's estate those residual benefits not received
by a deceased employee.
12
(2) A contributory profit-sharing and thrift plan
under which the employee designates a beneficiary to re-
ceive the fund if the employee fails to survive the distribu-
tion date.1
3
(3) A noncontributory trusteed pension plan under
which the employee has the right to designate who will
receive post mortem benefits.' 4
(4) A noncontributory pension plan, funded with life
insurance policies, in which the employee designates a bene-
ficiary to receive a survivor's annuity in consideration of a
reduced annuity to the employee, and the employee has
received some benefits before death.' 5
(5) A noncontributory annuity purchased by the em-
ployer under which the employee has the right to name a
beneficiary to receive benefits after his death.'"
(6) A contributory pension plan under which the
employee's estate or his beneficiary will receive the total
12 Gould v. Johnson, 156 Me. 446, 166 A.2d 481 (1960); Estate of Brackett, 342
Mich. 195, 69 N.W.2d 164 (1955) ; Estate of Daniel, 159 Ohio St. 109, 111 N.E.2d
252 (1953).
13 People v. Egbert, 436 P.2d 116 (Colo. 1968); People v. Bejarano, 145 Colo. 304,
358 P.2d 866 (1961) ; Estate of Dorsey, 366 Pa. 557, 79 A.2d 259 (1951).
14Estate of Patterson, 21 Ohio Op. 2d 55, 184 N.E.2d 562 (P. Ct. 1962) ; Estate of
Stone, 10 Wis. 2d 467, 103 N.W.2d 663 (1960).
15 In re Harbord's Estate, 132 N.Y.S.2d 647 (Sur. Ct. 1954).
1 Borchard v. Connelly, 140 Conn. 491, 101 A.2d 497 (1953); Estate of Patterson,
21 Ohio Op. 2d 55, 184 N.E.2d 562 (P. Ct. 1962); Estate of DeVenuto, 35 Pa.
D. & C.2d 352 (Orphans' Ct. 1964) ; Estate of Burke, 85 Pa. D. & C. 56 (Orphans'
Ct. 1953) ; Estate of Enbody, 85 Pa. D. & C. 49 (Orphans' Ct. 1953).
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of his contributions, plus interest, if he dies before retire-
ment. 1
7
(7) A pension plan under which the employee elects
to take a smaller pension in consideration of an annuity to
his surviving beneficiary."8
(8) A noncontributory plan which has no funding of
any kind.' 9
(9) A deferred, assignable compensation plan for
payments of a fixed amount each year for a number of
years after retirement, the employee naming his spouse as
beneficiary but retaining the right to change the beneficiary
at any time, and employee dies before receiving any pay-
ments .20
(10) A variety of modifications and combinations of
the foregoing benefit plans.
21
IV. STATE COURT DECISIONS: BENEFITS HELD TAXABLE
A review of some of the state decisions should serve to illus-
trate how these courts construe the various employee benefit plans.
For purposes of organization, those cases are first discussed which
find, for one reason or another, that benefit plans are taxable in
the estate of the employee. Next, those decisions are discussed which
hold for nontaxability.
An interesting early case, Estate of Dor'sey," deals with a prof it-
sharing trust to which employer and employee jointly contributed.
At the discretion of the trustees, death benefits were payable to the
beneficiary in cash or as an annuity, but the employer retained no
reversion. In view of the vested nature of the surviving employee's
right to receive the fund on retirement and his absolute right to
'T Estate of Richartz, 45 Cal. 2d 292, 288 P.2d 857 (1955) ; Estate of Simpson, 43 Cal.
2d 594, 275 P.2d 467 (1954) ; Cruthers v. Neeld, 14 N.J. 496, 103 A.2d 153 (1954) ;
Estate of Shade, 38 Ohio Op. 2d 357, 224 N.E.2d 401 (P. Ct. 1966); Estate of
Chadwick, 167 Ohio St. 373, 149 N.E.2d 5 '(1958) ; Estate of Burke, 85 Pa. D. & C.
56 (Orphans' Ct. 1953); Estate of Clark, 10 Utah 2d 427, 354 P.2d 112 (1960)
(court characterizing statute as imposing an estate tax).
18 People v. Hollingsworth, 436 P.2d 114 (Colo. 1968) ; Estate of Endemann, 307 N.Y.
100, 120 N.E.2d 514 (1954); Estate of Stone, 10 Wis. 2d 467, 103 N.W.2d 663
(1960) ; Estate of Sweet, 270 Wis. 256, 70 N.W.2d 645 (1955).
19 Dolak v. Sullivan, 145 Conn. 497, 144 A.2d 312 (1958); Estate of Dolbeer, 117
Ohio App. 517, 193 N.E.2d 174 (1962) ; Fitzpatrick v. State Tax Comm'n, 15 Utah
2d 29, 386 P.2d 896 (1963); Estate of Stevens, 266 Wis. 331, 63 N.W.2d 732
(1954).
2 0 Estate of Dolbeer, 117 Ohio App. 517, 193 N.E.2d 174 (1962) ; Estate of Cameron,
15 Pa. D. & C.2d 557 (Orphans' Ct. 1958).
21 Estate of Richartz, 45 Cal. 2d 292, 288 P.2d 857 (1955) ; People v. Egbert, 436 P.2d
116 (Colo. 1968); Borchard v. Connelly, 140 Conn. 491, 101 A.2d 497 (1953);
Cruthers v. Neeld, 14 N.J. 496, 103 A.2d 153 (1954) ; Estate of Endemann, 307 N.Y.
100, 120 N.E.2d 514 (1954).
22 366 Pa. 557, 79 A.2d 259 (1951).
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name a beneficiary or to permit his share in the fund to pass to his
estate, the court found that the employee possessed sufficient attri-
butes of ownership so that the fund was taxable in his estate. The
portions of the fund attributable to the employee's own contribu-
tions and to those of his employer were both subject to the tax.
Later cases attempted to interpose defenses against the levy of
the inheritance tax. One such defense raised the contention that the
decedent owned none of the after-death benefits since, during his
lifetime, he could not have reduced them to his own possession, nor
did he have possession in such degree as to effect their transfer.
The defense raised in the Dorsey case suggested that all the
decedent had was a power of appointment over property which he
did not own. Under the statute then applicable,2 3 a power of appoint-
ment was not taxable in the donee's estate but only in the estate of
the donor of the power, and taxation of the donor was limited to
cases in which a decedent had created the power- not a corporate
employer. Under this type of statute, if the death benefit was never-
theless to be taxed in the employee's (donee's) estate, the taxing
authorities had to rely on some theory other than power of appoint-
ment, e.g., they had to show some measure of ownership in the
decedent. The specific rationale used in Dorsey was to argue that
the decedent had the requisite ownership even of the employer's
contributed share of the fund in that the employee possessed the
power to transfer it, effective at death. Indeed, as pointed out by
the court, a power of appointment never can exist if the so-called
"donee" is the owner of the property.
In a Maine case,24 decided under a statute25 similar to the one
in Dorsey, it was urged that the decedent had merely a power of
appointment over the death benefits and hence no tax could be im-
posed. The argument was rejected, and it was held that the decedent
had sufficient ownership of the benefits to have made a transfer.
In contrast to the foregoing, many of the later cases have been
decided in states which have statutory provisions for taxing the exer-
cise or lapse of powers of appointment in the estate of the donee.
To impose the tax under such statutes, there seems to be no real
necessity of proving ownership or its substantial equivalence. The
fact of ownership can become relatively unimportant by first assert-
ing the decedent's ownership and then asserting, in the alternative,
that if the decedent did not transfer property which he did own,
he exercised or allowed to lapse a power of appointment over prop-
erty which he did not own.
23 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 2301(d) (1961).
24 Gould v. Johnson, 156 Me. 446, 166 A.2d 481 (1960).
25ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 3461(1) (B) (1964).
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Surprisingly, however, the device of arguing in the alternative
does not seem to have been widely adopted in states where the power
of appointment theory is clearly available to taxing authorities.
Instead, the cases have been decided for the most part either on the
theory of ownership or of third party beneficiary. Under the latter
theory, the contract is construed to be one for which the employee's
services constitute the consideration, and since payment is to be made
at or after death, there is a gift to take effect at death.
Similar results have been reached in cases involving contribu-
tory retirement annuities,2 6 noncontributory annuities, 7  pension
plans,2 8 and profit-sharing funds.2 9 In each case, death benefits
were included in decedent's gross estate on the theory of ownership
evidenced by some measure of authority the employee had to name
a beneficiary, or to otherwise influence the passage of the death
benefits to his estate.
The essentials of ownership have been found even in cases
where an employer has retained substantial control of an employee
fund. For example, benefits have been included in the gross estate,
as a transfer to take effect at death, even though in an unfunded
plan an employer could discontinue or modify benefits at any time,
and benefits would not be paid to an employee who left the com-
pany for any reason other than death or retirement. It has been
held that such a contract is between employer and employee for the
benefit of a third person, effective at death, and the consideration
is the employee's services. The uncertainties in the plan affect the
value, not the ownership, of benefits. 3 ° Even where a commercial
annuity is purchased by the employer in the name of the employee
but with refund to the employee's beneficiary in the nature of a death
benefit, the death benefit is taxable in the annuitant's estate.3 '
The fact that there are general statutes exempting the pensions
of public employees from "taxation" usually will not prevent their
being subject to inheritance taxation, since there is a tendency to
construe strictly such exemption statutes as referring to ad valorem
taxation.32
26 Cruthers v. Neeld, 14 N.J. 496, 103 A.2d 153 (1954); Estate of Clark, 10 Utah 2d
427, 354 P.2d 112 (1960).
27 Borchard v. Connelly, 140 Conn. 491, 101 A.2d 497 (1953).
28 Estate of Daniel, 159 Ohio St. 109, 111 N.E.2d 252 (1953).
29 Estate of Brackett, 342 Mich. 195, 69 N.W.2d 164 (1955).
3
0 Dolak v. Sullivan, 145 Conn. 497, 144 A.2d 312 (1958).
31 People v. Schallerer, 12 I11. 2d 240, 145 N.E.2d 585 (1957) ; Gregg v. Commissioner,
315 Mass. 704, 54 N.E.2d 169 (1944); see Borchard v. Connelly, 140 Conn. 491,
101 A.2d 497 (1953).
32 Estate of Simpson, 43 Cal. 2d 594, 275 P.2d 467 (1954); Estate of Endemann, 307
N.Y. 100, 120 N.E.2d 514 (1954).
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In a number of cases an attempt has been made to defend
against taxation of death benefits in the gross estate by asserting
that the statutory exclusion of insurance proceeds was applicable
to such benefits. The courts have uniformly found that the risk
element associated with insurance is not present in such arrange-
ments, and they have rejected that argument.3
8
Without discussing in further detail the remaining cases that
hold employee benefits to be taxable, it will suffice to summarize the
decisions as follows: (1) The employee had a sufficiently vested
interest or ownership in the death benefits; (2) The naming of
beneficiaries to receive benefits could be considered as a transfer
of property interests; or (3) The employee's acceptance of less than
full benefit was the consideration for the benefits payable to his
beneficiaries after death. 4
Another principle which is evident in this line of cases is that
the death benefits attributable to an employee's own contributions
are taxable in the employee's estate the same way as they would be
in a commercial annuity. In this connection, even death benefits
attributable to the employer are usually taxable to the estate on the
theory that the employee's services furnish the consideration for a
third party agreement by the employer to provide the death benefits.
The only provisos are that the benefits be vested with reasonable
certainty, or be assignable, and that the employee has reasonable
freedom of choice to name a beneficiary.
V. STATE COURT DECISIONS: BENEFITS HELD NONTAXABLE
A number of courts have declined on a variety of grounds to
include employee death benefits in the gross estate. For example, in
three Pennsylvania decisions it was concluded that the employee did
not possess the required ownership of benefits since he would have
had to live to receive them. In one of these cases, the pension plan
was such that benefits of an employee who did not name a recipient
33 Estate of Richartz, 45 Cal. 2d 292, 288 P.2d 857 (1955); Borchard v. Connelly, 140
Conn. 491, 101 A.2d 497 (1953); Garos v. State Tax Comm'n, 99 N.H. 319, 109
A.2d 844 (1954) ; Cruthers v. Neeld, 14 N.J. 496, 103 A.2d 153 (1954) ; Estate of
Rhodes, 197 Misc. 232, 94 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sur. Ct. 1949) ; Estate of Chadwick, 167
Ohio St. 373, 149 N.E.2d 5 (1958) ; Estate of Clark, 10 Utah 2d 427, 354 P.2d 112
(1954).
34 Estate of Richartz, 45 Cal. 2d 292, 288 P.2d 857 (1955) ; Estate of Simpson, 43 Cal.
2d 594, 275 P.2d 467 (1954); Dolak v. Sullivan, 145 Conn. 497, 144 A.2d 312
(1958); Borchard v. Connelly, 140 Conn. 491, 101 A.2d 497 (1953); Gould v.
Johnson, 156 Me. 446, 166 A.2d 481 (1960); Estate of Brackett, 342 Mich. 195,
69 N.W.2d 164 (1955); Garos v. State Tax Comm'n, 99 N.H. 319, 109 A.2d 844
(1954) ; Cruthers v. Neeld, 14 N.J. 496, 103 A.2d 153 (1954); Estate of Ende-
mann, 307 N.Y. 100, 120 N.E.2d 514 (1954); In re Harbord's Estate, 132 N.Y.S.2d
647 (Sur. Ct. 1954) ; Estate of Patterson, 21 Ohio Op. 2d 55, 184 N.E.2d 562 (P.
Ct. 1962) ; Estate of Chadwick, 167 Ohio St. 373, 149 N.E.2d 5 (1958) ; Estate of
Daniel, 159 Ohio St. 109, 111 N.E.2d 252 (1953) ; Estate of Dorsey, 366 Pa. 557,
79 A.2d 259 (1951) ; Estate of Cameron, 15 Pa. D. & C.2d 557 (Orphans' Ct. 1958);
Estate of Stone, 10 Wis. 2d 467, 103 N.W.2d 663 (1960).
1968
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
would go to his heirs and not to his estate. If there were a failure
to take the property, it would revert to the fund for the benefit of
the other participants. The right to divest the heirs and name others
was held to be a mere power of appointment, and since Pennsylvania
did not tax the exercise or lapse of such power, there was no tax.35
A companion case concerned two plans, one contributory and
the other noncontributory. In the first, the death benefits arose from
the employee's contributions and were held to be taxable because
of the ownership evidenced by the employee's right to withdraw his
contributions at any time. In the other, the benefits were attributable
to the employer's contributions, and the employee had no right of
withdrawal. These benefits were held nontaxable since the employee
lacked the attributes of ownership in the portion of the fund from
which they were payable. The latter part of the case was distinguished
from the Dorsey decision, where the employee had the right at all
times to withdraw his interest in the fund, including the employer's
paid-in share.3"
The third of the Pennsylvania cases concerned a noncontributory
plan in which the employer reserved the right of termination at any
time. Since the employee could not assign his interest, the court held
that he did not own the installments payable after his death and
had only a nontaxable power of appointment.
37
In an Ohio lower court case, a corporation's board of directors
authorized a contract to make payments to the wife of an employee
over a specified period, but the board reserved the right to discon-
tinue the payments if it found that the employee had engaged in
conduct which it considered detrimental to the interest of the com-
pany. The court held that the employee never had any interest in the
payments to his wife, and hence there was no transfer by him.
8
A somewhat similar Utah case involved an employment contract
whereby payments were made for a specified period with the pro-
vision that if the employee died in service, his wife would receive
the payments during the balance of the period of the contract. The
court held the payments to be income to the widow and not taxable
in the gross estate.
3 9
An inheritance tax law which provides that death benefits under
an employee benefit plan are not to be included in the gross estate
unless the employee has the right to possess, enjoy, assign, or antici-
pate the payments, has been construed quite literally by the Penn-
35 Estate of Enbody, 85 Pa. D. & C. 49 (Orphans' Ct. 1953).
36 Estate of Burke, 85 Pa. D. & C. 56 (Orphans' Ct. 1953).
37 Estate of DeVenuto, 35 Pa. D. & C.2d 352 (Orphans' Ct. 1964).
38 Estate of Dolbeer, 117 Ohio App. 517, 193 N.E.2d 174 '(1962).
39 Fitzpatrick v. State Tax Comm'n, 15 Utah 2d 29, 386 P.2d 896 (1963).
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sylvania courts. An employee was receiving benefits and had named
a beneficiary to take after his death, but it was held that he had
none of the described rights in the post mortem payment.40
A Wisconsin court has held, in at least two cases, that where
the decedent has no real choice as to the persons who receive death
benefits, they are not taxable in his gross estate. In Estate of Sweet,
41
the decedent had been a federal civil servant and, under the federal
law then in effect, his widow was entitled to certain benefits which
were beyond his control. The benefits to the widow were declared
to result not from the decedent's designation but rather from that
of the Federal Government. However, a strong dissent was entered
asserting that the benefits flowed from a third party agreement, the
consideration for which was the decedent's services.
Despite a contrary holding in an intervening case to the effect
that benefits are taxable where a decedent has the power to elect a
joint and survivorship annuity with his wife,42 the Wisconsin court
has held that where such a plan itself selected the beneficiary, with-
out the employee having any control over who should receive the
benefits, the amounts are not taxable.43
It should be noted that although the decedents in the Wisconsin
cases escaped taxation, a statute44 was in force which taxed the
exercise or lapse of powers of appointment. The statute, however,
expressly exempted powers under which the donee was not per-
mitted to appoint himself and could appoint only to the immediate
family group of the donee. For this reason invocation of this statute
would have been futile. In any event, where the employer selects
the beneficiary, the employee has no power of appointment.
Additional state cases holding employee benefits nontaxable
may be cited which depend upon variations of the rationale already
discussed. 45 A fundamental principle of these cases is a broad reli-
ance on nonownership or lack of control in the employee with varia-
tions dependent upon particular state statutes.
Of some relevance to the state decisions in this area are rulings
relating to the federal estate tax. Specifically, the Internal Revenue
Service has ruled that because the Social Security Act 46 does not
permit a decedent to select the recipient of benefit payments, a lump
40 Estate of Huston, 423 Pa. 620, 225 A.2d 243 (1967).
41 270 Wis. 256, 70 N.W.2d 645 (1955).
42 Estate of Stone, 10 Wis. 2d 467, 103 N.W.2d 663 (1960).
43 Estate of King, 28 Wis. 2d 431, 137 N.W.2d 122 (1965).
44 
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 72.01(5) (1957).
4SEstate of Shade, 38 Ohio Op. 2d 357, 224 N.E.2d 401 (P. Ct. 1966); Estate of
Stevens, 266 Wis. 331, 63 N.W.2d 732 (1954); O'Daniel v. District of Columbia,
CCH INH. EST. & GIFT TAX REP. 1 19,473 (1963). See generally Note. Taxation -
Retirement Plans - Election Under Joint and Survivor Option, 1961 WIs. L. REV. 153.
4642 U.S.C. § 402 (1964).
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sum payment to a spouse, as well as survivor's annuity payments
under the Act and workman's compensation death benefits payable
to persons prescribed in the Act, are not taxable in the decedent's
estate. Also covered by these rulings are benefits under the Railroad
Retirement Act.47 The principle thus developed for the estate tax
should be equally applicable to an inheritance tax.48
VI. TREATMENT OF EMPLOYEES' BENEFITS IN COLORADO
The Colorado Supreme Court has ruled on the inheritance tax-
ation of employee benefits on at least three occasions. The first of
these involved a case where the employer had established a savings
or thrift plan under which both employer and employee had made
contributions. The major issue was whether in Colorado- a non-
community property state- the entire amount of benefits attribut-
able to the employee's contributions made while he was employed
in community property states should be subject to tax or whether
the tax should be based upon only one-half of the amount of the
benefits. It was held that to the extent that benefits to the employee's
widow flowed from earnings in the community property states, her
interest in the benefits vested at the time the contributions were made
and hence were not subject to tax in the estate of the employee.4"
However, the employer's contributions were not vested in her and
hence the benefits flowing from them were subject to the tax. No
dispute existed as to the taxability of the benefits accrued during
employment in common law jurisdictions, since the employee retained
such control as to constitute essential ownership - if no beneficiary
were named, the benefits would flow to his estate. In making its
award, the court held that all the benefits flowing from the employee's
contributions while in common law states and one-half of the con-
tributions made while in community property states, along with all
of his employer's contributions, were includible in the employee's
taxable estate.
Two recent Colorado cases have adopted the Wisconsin view-
point that where the decedent's power to designate a beneficiary is
severely circumscribed or nonexistent, death benefits are not taxable.50
In the first, People v. Hollingsworth,51 the decedent was a federal
civil servant, as was the decedent in the Sweet case. Following the
4745 U.S.C. § 228(e) (1964).
48 Rev. Rul. 60-70, 1960-1 CuM. BULL. 372; Rev. Rul. 56-637, 1956-2 CuM. BULL.
600; Rev. Rul. 55-87, 1955-1 Cum. BULL. 112; E.T. 18, 1940-2 CuM. BULL,
285.
49 People v. Bejarano, 145 Colo. 304, 358 P.2d 866 (1961).
50 Estate of King, 28 Wis. 2d 431, 137 N.W.2d 122 (1965) ; Estate of Sweet, 270 Wis.
256, 70 N.W.2d 645 (1955).
51436 P.2d 114 (Colo. 1968).
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Sweet rationale, the Colorado Supreme Court held that the benefits
payable to decedent's widow did not constitute property until the
worker's death but were only a right or status and hence not trans-
ferable by decedent. Therefore, the death benefits were not included
in decedent's gross estate.
In the second case, People v. Egbert,"2 decedent had purchased
group life insurance which was convertible at death into a certificate
for a lump sum benefit to his widow as named beneficiary. The plan
was subject to change by the employer at any time, and the bene-
ficiary's rights depended on the plan as it stood at the decedent's
death. The class of beneficiaries which could be designated included
only persons who were dependent on the decedent for support, and
it was not possible to dispose of the benefits by will or to name his
estate to receive them. The court held that the decedent did not own,
control, or possess the property from which the widow's benefits
flowed and, accordingly, could not make a gift of them to take effect
at death. The court noted that the state did not attempt to classify
the death benefits as insurance since, in that case, the insurance
exemption would have applied.
The foregoing cases were largely decided on the lack of owner-
ship in the employee. In neither case was a contention made that the
employee possessed a power of appointment over the property so as
to make the question of title immaterial. Yet it seems that plausible
arguments could have been advanced for taxability of the benefits
based upon a theory of power of appointment.
It will be recalled that in Pennsylvania and Maine, states in
which the exercise of powers of appointment did not result in taxa-
tion in the estate of the donee of the power, it was unsuccessfully
urged that the decedent's designation of a beneficiary of death bene-
fits was not a transfer but merely the exercise of a power." Since
he had title, however, he was deemed to have more than a mere
power of appointment.
A Colorado inheritance tax law,54 patterned from a New York
statute,55 was in effect at the time of the deaths of the decedents in
the Hollingsworth and Egbert cases. This law provided for the taxa-
tion of the exercise or the omission or failure of exercise of a power
of appointment as though the donee of the power had owned the
subject matter of the power and had transferred it by his will to
52 436 P.2d 116 (Colo. 1968).
5 3 Gould v. Johnson, 156 Me. 446, 166 A.2d 481 (1960); Estate of Dorsey, 366 Pa.
557, 79 A.2d 259 (1951) ; Estate of DeVenuto, 35 Pa. D. & C.2d 352 (Orphans' Ct.
1964) ; Estate of Enbody, 85 Pa. D. & C. 49 (Orphans' Ct. 1953).
54 CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 138-3-12 (1963). The statute has subsequently been
amended, effective June 17, 1967.
55 Cons. Laws N.Y., Ch. 60, Art. 10 § 220(6) (1913).
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persons succeeding to the property. In a case decided under New
York law, a decedent had exercised a power to appoint certain real
property by deed. It was held that on his death the transfer was
constitutionally subject to inheritance tax, as though he had trans-
ferred it by a will which became effective on the date of the deed. 6
Since this decision antedated Colorado's adoption of the provisions
of the New York law, the New York decision probably is controlling
in Colorado.
5 7
In the Hollingsworth case, the decedent, a federal civil servant,
was permitted by the Government Organization and Employees
statute 58 to elect a reduced pension for himself so as to provide a
survivor's annuity for his wife. The annuity became effective when
the pensioner died. The benefits under this arrangement arose only
by virtue of the election of a reduced pension and the creation of
the survivor's annuity in the spouse. While the pensioner was held
by the court not to have owned the property from which the sur-
vivor's annuity was derived, it seems clear that his act of election and
designation was the effective agency which channelled property he
did not own to the survivor-the exercise of a power of appointment.
In the Egbert case, the employer had a plan by which a group
annuity life insurance benefit was convertible at death into a lump
sum payment to a beneficiary named by the employee. The plan per-
mitted the employee to name as beneficiary only persons who were
dependents of the employee. The case does not state what would
have happened to the benefits in the absence of a designation, but
it is clear that without a designation the beneficiary would have
received nothing. The court held that the employee did not own the
property from which the benefits flowed since the benefits could
not be disposed of by his will or made payable to his estate. The
court found that the benefits passed directly from the employer to
the beneficiary widow. The effective agency which channelled the
benefits to her was the employee's designation - an exercise of a
power of appointment over property which the decedent did not own.
VII. EFFECT OF 1967 AMENDMENT TO INSURANCE PROVISIONS
OF COLORADO INHERITANCE TAX LAW
Before leaving the subject of Colorado inheritance taxation of
employee death benefits, consideration should be given to a 1967
5Estate of Wendel, 223 N.Y. 433, 119 N.E. 879 (1918). See 28 AM. JUR. Inheritance,
Estate, and Gilt Taxes §§ 211, 212 (1959).
5 7 Cruse v. Stayput Clamp & Coupling Co., 113 Colo. 254, 156 P.2d 397 (1945);
People v. Linn, 357 11. 220, 191 N.E. 450 (1934), holding that when Illinois
adopted from New York the equivalent of our CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 138-3-12
(1963), it adopted New York prior construction. See 50 AM. JUR. Statutes §§ 458-62
(1944).
5 U.S.C. § 2258 (1964).
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amendment to the Colorado inheritance tax statute which may sweep
into gross estates some, but probably not many, employee death
benefits. Until 1967, life insurance proceeds (annuity contracts being
expressly excluded from its definition) payable to, or in trust for,
named or described beneficiaries were included in the gross estate,
but were subject to a $75,000 exclusion if the decedent possessed
any of the incidents of ownership at death, a provision which was
noted in the Egbert case." Effective March 31, 1967, this provision
was modified to include in the proceeds entitled to the benefit of
the exclusion "any annuity contract or pension benefits."'60
The statute requires that the decedent possess, at death, "any
of the incidents of ownership." Historically, this phrase seems to have
been applied only to life insurance, and it comprehends many powers
of dominion over the policy which fall short of, but are akin to, abso-
lute ownership. It includes such rights as that to change the bene-
ficiary, to surrender the policy for its cash value, to cancel the policy,
to assign it, to pledge it, or to borrow from the insuror. Except for
the right to change the beneficiary, none of the customary incidents
of ownership is likely to have any application to the ordinary com-
mercial annuity or to pension benefits because such rights usually
are denied by the express terms of the contract under which such
arrangements come into being. The unlimited right to change the
beneficiary of an insurance policy, regardless of how acquired, be-
comes significant for death tax purposes because, under the pro-
visions of the standard policy, if no beneficiary is effectively named,
the proceeds will be payable to the insured's estate,"1 so that if the
holder of the power is also the insured, this right enables him to
divert the proceeds from his estate, and if he is not the insured, he
can channel the proceeds to himself or to his estate.62 Such a power
is practically the equivalent of ownership. A number of the cases on
employee death benefits which have been previously discussed make
it clear that, without regard to the propriety of applying the term
"incidents of ownership" to it, the power of the holder to pass the
proceeds to himself or his estate, or to prevent such passage by nam-
ing a beneficiary to receive them, constitutes "ownership" and causes
the benefits to be included in the gross estate for tax purposes. Thus,
whether the decedent "owned" the death benefits or had "incidents
of ownership" with respect to them, if he can channel the proceeds
59436 P.2d 116 (Colo. 1968).
60 
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 138-3-9 (Supp. 1967).
Il 2A J. APPLEMAN & J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 1122 (1966).
62 2 J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL GIFT AND ESTATE TAXATION § 17.13 (1959);
C. LOWNDES & R. KRAMER, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES § 13.7 (2d ed. 1962).
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to himself or his estate or from himself or his estate, they will be
part of his gross estate for inheritance tax purposes. Accordingly, the
amendment should have very little practical effect on the inheritance
taxation of death benefits in Colorado, but, of course, the exact effect
will depend on the details of the plan and the extent of the rights
conferred upon the employee.
A question of construction inevitably will arise under the amend-
ment to the exclusionary provision. The amendment refers only to
"pension benefits." Does this language remove from the operation
of the amendment death benefits under the variety of employee plans
heretofore described which are payable to him in a lump sum or
are payable to him in installments under other than strictly pension
plans? It may be argued that the conjunction of annuities with pen-
sion benefits implies that the amendment is intended to apply only
to such survivorship benefits as are payable under purely pension
plans after the death of an employee who was receiving benefits
in installments. However, the addition of the word "benefits" strongly
suggests that the legislature did not intend to confine the subject
matter of the amendment only to installment pension plans. And,
the Colorado Supreme Court has construed the word "pension"
broadly so as to include, for example, the funeral expenses of the
pensioner.63 Therefore, it would appear that the words "pension
benefits" should be construed to include death benefits under any
plan, whether or not the employee is to receive benefits in install-
ments, which is designed to assist the employee in funding his retire-
ment needs.
CONCLUSION
In both of the recent Colorado cases, even conceding the lack
of ownership in the employee, the application of the power of ap-
pointment provision would have taxed the death benefits in the same
way as if the decedent had actually owned the property and had
passed it by will, to become effective on the date of the designation.
The argument that a decedent has such a power of appointment
over death benefits will not be available in future Colorado cases,
except in an extremely limited way, because the Colorado statute
was amended effective June 17, 1967. Taxation of powers in the
estate of the donee now requires that they must be created by dece-
dents, that is, by will or by decedent's inter vivos transfer. 64 In those
63Redmon v. Davis, 115 Colo. 415, 174 P.2d 945 (1946). The case also states that a
grant of assistance to one, merely because he has reached a certain age, is a pension.
See 31A WORDS & PHRASES 548 et seq. (1957), for examples of conflicting definitions
of the word 'pension."
4 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 138-3-12 (Supp. 1967).
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jurisdictions which retain provisions similar to the prior Colorado
law, invocation of such provisions should result in taxation of death
benefits in many cases in which "ownership" is subject to question. 65
65 CCH INH. EST. & GIFT TAX REp. f 12,030 (1963) has an excellent synoptic
table of principal features of death tax statutes of the states, including the tax treat-
ment of powers of appointment. It also has an editorial discussion of powers of
appointment in the Treatise section at § 1540 et seq., and a detailed editorial discus-
sion of the tax treatment of powers of appointment in each state section under the
same number (with appropriate reference to the statute itself). It appears that a
majority of states have statutes taxing powers similar to that in Colorado prior to
1967 (which, in turn, was the adoption of an early New York statute, since repealed).
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